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LEGISLATIVE NOTES

NEW FLORIDA APPORTIONMENT OF ESTATE TAXES
Florida Laws 1949, c. 25435
Chapter 25435, enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1949, provides
that, unless the decedent has specifically directed otherwise, the state
and federal estate taxes are to be apportioned among all persons interested in the estate, in the same ratios that their respective interests
bear to the total taxable estate.

I.

GENRAL BACKGEOuND

This statute is drawn against a background in which death taxes
are playing an increasingly greater part in raising revenue for state
and federal purposes, as well as in effectuating the present federal
policy of discouraging large accumulations of wealth by making it
impossible to pass on substantial amounts when one dies.' There are
two forms of death taxes: inheritance taxes and estate taxes. The
former are levied against the privilege of receiving property, whereas
the latter are exacted for the privilege of transmitting it.2 Since New
York has an estate tax, the incidence of which is the privilege of transmission, it has held its apportionment statute inapplicable to the estate
of a deceased domiciled elsewhere; when he dies leaving property in
New York, the law of his domicile governs the apportionment, if any,
and in the absence of such law there is no apportionment.3 Inasmuch
as neither the Federal Government nor the State of Florida has an
inheritance tax, the apportionment statute pertains to estate taxes
only.
Prior to the enactment of our new act, Florida and the decided
weight of American authority agreed that when the intent of the deceased, including a testator, was not clearly set out the residuary
estate bore the entire estate tax, 4 although the testator could by suit-

e.g., Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 769, 167 So. 669, 673 (1936).
"See,
2GmswoLu, CASES AND MATmrS oN FEmIAL TAxATioN 115 (2d ed. 1946).
3
1n re Bernie's Estate, 74 N. Y. S.2d 887 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
4y. M. C. A. of Columbus v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1924); In re Bernay's Estate,
150 Fla. 414, 7 So.2d 444 (1942).
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able designation indicate which portion of his estate was to bear it.5
Often this ruling caused the testator to leave the least to those he
loved most, particularly in those instances in which he had miscalculated the probable size of his estate or of the taxes to be borne, or was
not aware that the residuary estate would have to bear the entire tax.
Obviously, if the maxim that every man is presumed to know the law
is pursued to its blind ultimate, it follows that the testator lets the
burden of the tax fall where he knows it will; but the disparity between this theoretical maxim and practical reality has caused several
states to alter their law so as to place on each person receiving benefits from an estate his portion of the tax burden, unless the testator
specifies otherwise. 6
The federal courts have consistently exhibited a willingness to follow the law of the state in question as regards assignment of the
burden of both state and federal estate taxes, so long as the Federal
Government receives its revenue. The Florida Supreme Court accurately summarized the federal position, with ample citations,7 in
Henderson v. Usher:8
"The federal government is not concerned with who shall ultimately bear the burden of paying the estate taxes, but is concerned only with collecting the tax, leaving it to the states to
fix the time, and principle, or method of determining who shall
assume the burden of paying the tax."
In 1924 the Florida Constitution was amended so as to forbid levy
by this state of estate, inheritance, or income taxes against its residents. 9 Two years later Congress passed a statute allowing a credit
of up to eighty percent of the basic federal estate tax for any state
5Y. M. C. A. of Columbus v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1924).
6E.g., N. Y. DEc. Est. LAW §124 (1930); PA. STAT., tit. 20, §844 (1937);
Art. 81, §126 (Cum. Supp. 1947); R. I. GEN. LAWS,
c. 43, §33 (1938); ARx. ANN. STAT. §68-150 (1947); MAss. ANN. LAWS Art. 65A,
§5 (Cum. Supp. 1948); N. H. Laws 1943, c. 175; CONN. GEN. STAT. §2076
MD. ANN. CODE: GEN. LAWs

(Supp.
1949).
7

E.g., Y. M. C. A. of Columbus v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1924); Edwards v.
Slocum, 287 Fed. 651 (C. C. A. 6th 1923), ajf'd., 264 U. S. 61 (1924); Hill v.
Grissom, 299 Fed. 641 (D. D. C. 1924).
8125 Fla. 709, 731, 170 So. 846, 854 (1936).
9
FLA. CONST. Art. 9, §11.
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estate tax paid.' 0 As a result of this enactment, Florida in 1980 further
amended its Constitution so as to take advantage of this deduction
by permitting the levy of an estate tax up to eighty percent of the
basic federal tax." At this time, lacking an apportionment statute,
Florida by court decisions followed the weight of American authority
and placed the entire burden of estate taxes on the residuary estate
whenever the testator had expressed no contrary instructions.
In 1949, however, our Legislature recognized the problem previously faced by other states and enacted its apportionment statute. 12
The gist of this, which appears in the first two sections, follows the
corresponding statute of New York,' s although Sections 8, 4 and 5
are not taken therefrom. Nevertheless, this near-duplication renders
the New York cases construing that statute of great value in interpreting the Florida enactment.
It might be added parenthetically, as regards the widow, that, since
Florida has held dower subject to estate and inheritance taxes whenever she elects against the will, the apportionment statute should
lessen her taxes somewhat by virtue of the allocation to the legatees
borne in its entirety by her
of shares of the total burden formerly
14
estate.
residuary
the
dower and
1044 STAT. 70 (1926), as amended, 26 U. S. C. §813(b) (1946). There are
today two federal estate taxes: the basic tax and the larger additional tax. The
credit is allowed against the basic tax only and applies to the tax itself rathey
than merely to the taxable base.
CONST. Art. 9, §11; FLA. STAT., c. 198 (1949).
"Fr.
12
Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25435, FLA. STAT. §734.041 (1949). Sec. 1 of c. 25435
provides that state and federal death taxes shall be proportionally prorated by the
county judge among those persons interested in the taxable estate unless the
testator directs otherwise. Sec. 2 directs him to order any person in possession of
some part of the gross estate to pay a pro rata share of the tax. Sec. 3 bars recovery
of taxes from insurance companies on policies issued either on the life of the
decedent or in which he owned any interest at his death. Sec. 4 applies the statute
to estates of all persons dying after Jan. 1, 1948, as well as to all payment of
estate or death taxes made or required to be made after June 13, 1949. Sec. 5
directs severability of the statute as regards any portions invalidated. Sec. 6 sets
the effective date at the time the act becomes a law. It became a law without
approval of the governor on June 13, 1949.
13 N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAw §124.
14FLa. STAT. §731.34 (1949); In re McMillan's Estate, 158 Fla. 898, 30 So.
2d 354 (1947); Homey v. Rhea, 152 Fla. 817, 12 So.2d 302 (1948); Murphy
v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709,
170 So. 846 (1936); as regards dower generally see Legis., 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
118 (1949).
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II.

SECTIONS 1 AND

1.

2:

APPORTONMENT AND COLLECION

Equitable Proration

Both the New York and Florida statutes direct that the taxes be
"equitably prorated." At first glance this may appear to be an anomaly
or even a contradiction in terms, but closer examination reveals that
such is not the case. By the coupling of these terms the Legislature
has taken cognizance of the multitude of varying situations that will
be presented by future wills, and has attempted to lay down a somewhat elastic standard for meeting these situations.
The legislative mandate now prescribes proration of the taxes, that
is, apportionment among the beneficiaries on the basis of their respective mathematically calculated shares of the taxable estate. But
what is to enter into each type of estate, on the one hand, in determining the total from which the actual dollar amount of each share is
reckoned; and, on the other hand, what deductions, directly related
to taxes, are to be credited against the whole estate? At this point the
legislative body has ceased definite formulation; instead it has left
this function to the judiciary, with the solitary guide-post that the
results must be "equitable." Case law must follow; it has already
appeared in New York and other states, and undoubtedly it will develop in Florida also. For example, who should receive the benefit
of discount for early payment; who should be saddled with the difference between estate and gift taxes when an attempted inter vivos
transfer later fails taxwise as a gift; or who should meet the penalty
for late payment, and under what circumstances?
The New York courts have held that, instead of being prorated
among the general legatees subject to the tax, the entire discount for
early payment accrues to the benefit of the residuary legatee on the
theory that the residuary estate would have been entitled to income
earned during the administration period on the sum prepaid if the
payment had been delayed until the tax became due. 5 Similarly,
when an inter vivos transfer is included in the gross estate, because
made in contemplation of death, and a gift tax has previously been

15E.g., In re Murdoch's Estate, 142 Misc. 186, 254 N. Y. Supp. 154 (Surr. Ct.
1931). There is as yet no discount for early payment of Florida estate taxes.
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paid on the transfer, the estate tax is charged on a pro rata basis
against all beneficiaries of the estate rather than solely against the
donees of the inter vivos gift, and the gift tax already paid is ratably
credited in the same manner as an offset. 16 Although several cases
state that penalties and interest for late payment of taxes are considered part of the tax and are apportionable among the various beneficiaries, 17 an exception is made when the person causing the delay
can be determined; in such event the penalties and interest are allocated entirely to him.18
All this is not to say, of course, that rules do not actually come into
existence. Bases of proration, once judicially established, bind the
courts in future factual situations falling into the determined categories. If these bases prove unsatisfactory, then legislative action is in
order; but by such time the problem involved can be clearly recognized, and accordingly the appropriate legislative change can intelligently be made by statute. Meanwhile stare decisis applies, and rules
of law are gradually built up by the judiciary. As the highest court of
New York delineated this process in the traditional manner In re Del
Drago's Estate:19
'Whether it is just and equitable in all cases to impose the tax
upon the estate as a whole and not upon the specific legatees on
the benefits they derive from the estate is a matter admitting of
wide diversity of opinion. It is not the province of the courts to
resolve that conflict. 'The Congress has spoken and it is our func20
tion to interpret, not to legislate."

16

1n re Blumenthal's Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N. Y. S.2d 688 (Surr. Ct.
1943), aff'd, 293 N. Y. 707, 56 N. E.2d 588 (1944).
l7Chase Nat. Bank v. Mackenzie, 192 Misc. 172, 76 N. Y. S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct.
1947); In re Clark's Estate, 169 Misc. 202, 7 N. Y. S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
18
1n re Ryles Estate, 170 Misc. 450, 10 N. Y. S.2d 597 (Sur. Ct. 1989).
19287 N. Y. 61, 78, 79, 88 N. E.2d 131, 139, 140 (1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 U. S. 95 (1942).
20
The quotation within the quotation is from Matter of Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407,
420, 124 N. E. 4, 8 (1919). See also In re Mollenhauer's Will, 257 App. Div.
296, 13 N. Y. S.2d 619, 622 (2d Dep't 1939): "The determination of the tax
apportionment by a definite formula has been made by the Legislature and its
action in this respect is final . .. and amelioration thereof is a legislative and
not a judicial matter."
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2. Intent of Testator
The Florida statute is not applicable when the testator has clearly
indicated his wish as to where the burden of the tax is to fall; 21 but
it is well to observe that the New York courts, in construing their
similar statute, have consistently placed the onus of establishing nonapportionment on those seeking it.22 They have insisted that the
statute applies unless the language of the testator is clear and unambiguous, and have even gone so far as to refuse the legatee a preference
in the apportionment of estate taxes when this is claimd solely on the
basis of testamentary directions that certain benefits under the will
be granted a priority in payment.23 Indeed, inter vivos transfers later
included in the gross estate as made in contemplation of death have
been ratably taxed along with the residuary estate, notwithstanding
specific directions in the will that the estate taxes be paid out of the
24
latter.
Perhaps the overall effect of the New York statute can be most
clearly expressed by saying that a strong presumption in favor of apportionment now obtains, and that this presumption can be rebutted
by nothing short of clear and unambiguous proof of an intent on the
part of the testator to prescribe non-apportionment. Even then, the
principle of non-apportionment will be extended no further than the
words of the testator render its application mandatory.
III.

SEcrioN

3:

EXEMPTION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES

FROM LiABnxr

The Florida Legislature, apparently having taken cognizance of the
New York decisions exempting insurance companies from liability
21

Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25485, §1, FLA. STAT. §734.041(1) (1949).
E.g., In re Dettmer's Will, 179 Misc. 844, 40 N. Y. S.2d 99 (Surr. Ct. 1943);
In re Klein's Estate, 175 Misc. 961, 25 N. Y. S.2d 869 (Surf. Ct. 1941); In re
22

Meynen's Estate, 173 Misc. 19, 18 N. Y. S.2d 62 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Kaufman's Estate, 170 Misc. 436, 10 N. Y. S.2d 616 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
23
E.g., In re Kelly's Will, 86 N. Y. S.2d 441 (Sur. Ct. 1949); In re Bun's
Estate, 72 N. Y. S.2d 905 (Sur. Ct. 1947); In re Blumenthal's Estate, 180 Misc.
895, 42 N. Y. S.2d 898 (SunT. Ct. 1943).
24
1n re Appel's Estate, 189 Misc. 417, 69 N. Y. S.2d 772 (Sur. Ct. 1947);
In re Blumenthal's Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N. Y. S.2d 688 (Sur. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 293 N. Y. 707, 56 N. E.2d 588 (1944); In re Iselin's Will, 41 N. Y. S.2d
808 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
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for taxes on proceeds paid directly to beneficiaries on the death of
an insured, has provided in Section 3 that the act does not authorize
recovery of any taxes from any insurance company on the proceeds
of a policy on the life of the decedent. New York has held that an
insurer is not a person interested or person in possession of taxable
property within the terms of its statute permitting recovery by the
25
executor from such person.
IV.

4: APPLiCAXON TO ESTATES Or PERSONS
DyiNG AFnm JANUARt 1, 1948

SECriON

Section 4 of the Florida statute specifically makes it effective retroactively to estates of decedents dying after January 1, 1948, although
the statute did not become a law until June 13, 1949. The Florida
Constitution contains no general prohibition of retroactive laws as
such; and neither does the Constitution of the United States.2 6 Consequently this section of the act must be challenged, if at all, on the
ground that it contravenes the due process clause of one of these two
constitutions.

27

A retroactive state law, unless running afoul of some other distinct
constitutional inhibition, could operate to divest property rights prior
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; but since then the
protection afforded by the due process clause has prevented such
divestiture.2 8 Today the destruction of vested rights would render
this section of the Florida apportionment act unconstitutional. This
in turn brings us squarely to the question of what constitutes a vested
right. The Supreme Court of the United States has defined it as an
immediate and fixed right of present and future enjoyment and has
vested in
made the further qualification that rights are said to be
29
contradistinction to their being contingent or expectant.
In this connection it must be noted that Florida adopts the death
25

1n re Zahn's Estate, 278 App. Div. 476, 77 N. Y. S.2d 904 (1st Dep't 1948).

26E.g., Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist. v. Forbes Pioneer Boat
Line, 80 Fla. 252, 86 So. 199 (1920), rev'd, 258 U. S. 388 (1922); Kentucky
Union
Co. v. Commonwealth, 219 U. S. 140 (1911).
2
7U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV; FLA. CoNsT. Deci. of Rights, §12.
28Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S. 293 (1877); Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C.
472,2 917 S. E. 589 (1893).
Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry., 161 U. S. 646 (1896).
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of the testator as the event that vests the right to legacies and devises
unless the testator has provided in his will that some other event must
happen prior thereto.3 0 This statute has been applied several times
by the Supreme Court of Florida.3 1
Since retroactivity alone does not result in unconstitutionality, the
same law may be valid as applied to one set of facts and yet invalid
as applied to others. 32 It follows that the specific attempted application of the statute becomes the decisive factor in squaring it with the
33
organic state and federal prohibitions.
Now let us consider som6 of the factual situations that may arise.
Assume that the testator makes his will in 1938 and dies in August
of 1949, shortly after the enactment of the apportionment statute.
Certain specific legatees claim their shares free and clear of estate
taxes, on the ground that the will was drawn in contemplation of the
law governing in 1938. Testamentary disposition of property is not
a natural right but is rather a creature derived solely from statutes.
Accordingly this right is at all times subject to regulation and control
by the legislative authority that creates it.34 It is clear, of course, that
there is no vested right in having the law continue as it is; and no
contention against constitutionality can be successfully made under
this set of facts. 35 All the beneficiary had in this instance was an
expectancy, and this does not constitute a vested interest.3 6
Different considerations apply when the testator makes his will in
1938 and dies just prior to the passage of the act, so that upon its
enactment his property is still in administration, with the assets undistributed and the taxes unpaid as yet. The first serious question of
constitutionality arises here. Before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment a Montana case indicated that retroactive application did
30

§731.21 (1949).
E.g., Hurt v. Davidson, 130 Fla. 822, 178 So. 556 (1937); Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1925); Jones v. Shomaker, 41 Fla. 232, 26
So. 191 (1899).
S2 Magee v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 256 Mass. 512, 153 N. E. 1 (1926).
83U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, §12.
84 Taylor v. Paine, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944).
85 1n re Stanfield's Estate, 170 Misc. 447, 10 N. Y. S.2d 613 (Surr. Ct. 1939),
aff'd, 257 App. Div. 932, 12 N. Y. S.2d 1022 (1st Dep't 1939).
8
6Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry., 161 U. S. 646 (1896); Cusick v. Feldpausch,
259 Mich. 349, 243 N. W. 226 (1932).
FLA. STAT.

31
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not violate federal organic law.37 After the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, in view of inferences gathered by the Montana
court from certain United States Supreme Court decisions, 38 it squarely
reversed its previous holding.39 This limitation was not strictly necessary. The true federal position, taken in Cahen v. Brewster,40 was that
in defining an inheritance tax as a tax on succession, and not on the
property itself, it was merely determining the nature of the tax rather
than prescribing the time of imposition; federal law does not prevent
a state from fixing the time of vesting at the death of the testator, at
distribution, or after payment of taxes. This determination has been
amply sustained. 41 Accordingly, from the standpoint of federal law,
the constitutionality of the 1949 Florida provision swings on the
Florida law governing the vesting. Does this occur at death, or upon
completion of probate, or upon distribution of assets, or upon payment of estate taxes, or upon some combination of these factors?
The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated in 1945 that the imposition of an estate tax, pursuant to the local apportionment statute,
against an inter vivos trust later included in the gross estate for tax
purposes was not unconstitutional as a deprivation of property, even
42
though the statute in question was passed after the testator had died.
The reason given was that the property had not yet been distributed,
nor had the taxes been paid. The opinion 43 quoted United States v.
Perkins" as authority for the proposition that it is not until the
property

...

. has yielded its contribution to the state that it becomes

the property of the legatee." This Massachusetts case 4 5 was cited
with approval and followed by New York in Central Hanover Bank
S7Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, 20 Mont. 297, 51 Pac. 267 (1897).
38
Binney v. Long, 299 U. S. 280 (1936); United States v. Jones, 236 U. S.
106 (1915); Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543 (1906); Knowlton v. Moore, 178

U. S.41 (1900).
89In re Clark, 105 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d 401 (1937).
40203 U. S.543 (1906).
41Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582 (1981); Chase Nat. Bank v. United States,
278 U. S. 327 (1929); Salomon v. State Tax Comm'n, 278 U. S.484 (1929);
Watson
v. Comptroller, 254 U. S.122 (1920).
42
Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston, Ex'rs v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston,
Trustees, 318 Mass. 563, 62 N. E.2d 831 (1945).
431d. at 573, 62 N. E.2d at 837.
44
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S.625, 628 (1896).
45See note 42 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss1/4

10

Slater and Cone: New Florida Apportionment of Estate Taxes
92

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

and Trust Co. v. Peabody46 in applying a Connecticut apportionment
statute to the estate of a Connecticut citizen who predeceased its
enactment. The New York court emphasized the fact that at the time
such application was sought no taxes had been paid.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania In re Jeffery's Estate,47 likewise
applied the apportionment statute of that state to the estate of a
decedent who died before its enactment but whose estate was in the
course of administration when the act was passed. Taxes had already
been paid by the fiduciary; yet no significance was accorded this fact.
Florida specifically fixes the time of vesting at the death of the
deceased, 48 whereas such a statutory provision is lacking in Connecticut, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. This fact greatly weakens, if
indeed it does not nullify, any persuasive effect that the foregoing
decisions of those jurisdictions might otherwise have in sustaining
the retroactive application of the new Florida apportionment statute.
As long as Section 731.21 of Florida Statutes 1949 remains on the
books, it is difficult to see how apportionment can be applied retroactively in this state without destroying vested rights. It is no answer
to say that estate taxes must be paid before any net estate can be
reckoned. The sole issue is: Which beneficiary must meet the payment? Section 731.21 fixes the date of such determination; and the
tax law on that date sets both the tax burden and its effect on the
net shares.
Another set of facts presents an even stronger case against retroactive apportionment. A testator makes his will in 1938 and dies prior
to the passage of the 1949 statute; in fact, it is passed while administration of the estate is still in progress. Some of the property has
been distributed but the taxes have not been paid. In this situation,
the time of vesting should still be the determining factor, of course,
in considering constitutionality. Our Supreme Court might in this instance have an additional reason for forbidding retroactive application
of the statute, in that collection of a retroactive tax after the property
has been received, and perhaps dissipated, by the legatee occasions
administrative difficulties as well as a hardship on the legatee.
As a final situation, assume that the testator executes his will in
1938 and dies prior to the passage of the statute. Assume further that
46190 Misc. 66, 68 N. Y. S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
47333 Pa. 15, 3 A.2d 393 (1939).
48
FLA. STAT. §731.21 (1949).
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at the time the statute was passed all estate taxes had been paid out
of the residuary estate and the property had been distributed. The
residuary legatee now demands apportionment and contribution from
the specific legatees. Here it is most unlikely that the Court would
sustain retroactive application of the statute, especially when the
number of probable adjustments and repercussions are considered.
Such application would not only disregard the time of vesting fixed
by statute, but even without such a provision the rights to the property
should at least have vested by the time the taxes were paid and the
property distributed.
V. SECMON 5: SEvmUmBin

Y CLAUSE

Section 5 of the apportionment statute is the typical provision that
each section of the act is indicative of the legislative intent, independently of the other sections, and that if any section be declared
unconstitutional the other sections remain nonetheless valid. This
language saves the remainder of the statute, even if the retroactive
provisions should be held unconstitutional.
This section also contains the statement that the statute is ".
declaratory of existing public policy... " Inasmuch, however, as the
statute is obviously in derogation of the previously existing law and
is intended to effect a change, it could scarcely be declaratory of
existing public policy. Hence this statement has no significance other
than to indicate that the Legislature is continuing to enact laws conforming to the desires of the electorate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This statute represents a decided step forward in Florida estate
tax law. Formerly, a will frequently failed to carry out the intent of the
testator because little or no consideration was given to the payment
of estate taxes. Yet today these have assumed mammoth proportions.
The practice of making specific bequests to charities, friends, and
even distant relatives while naming those nearest in kinship and
affection as beneficiaries of the residuary estate is only too familiar.
Because of a logical though false assumption as to the law on the
part of the deceased, or because of his failure even to consider the
impact of the burden of the estate tax, those whom he intended to
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